The Programmatic Bias in the Discussion on Social Mechanisms in Sociology by Cardona, Andrés
     
 
The Programmatic Bias  
in the Discussion on  
Social Mechanisms in Sociology 
 
SFB 882 Working Paper Series ○  No. 23 ○  July 2013 
DFG Research Center (SFB) 882 From Heterogeneities to Inequalities 
http://www.sfb882.uni-bielefeld.de/  
 
Andrés Cardona 
 
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Andrés Cardona 
 
The Programmatic Bias in the Discussion on Social Mechanisms in Sociology 
 
SFB 882 Working Paper Series, No. 23  
DFG Research Center (SFB) 882 From Heterogeneities to Inequalities 
Research Project A1 
Bielefeld, July 2013 
 
SFB 882 Working Paper Series 
General Editors: Martin Diewald and Thomas Faist 
ISSN 2193-9624 
 
This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 882 Working Papers are refereed scholarly papers. Submissions are reviewed by peers 
in a two-stage SFB 882 internal and external refereeing process before a final decision on 
publication is made.  
 
The Working Paper Series is a forum for presenting works in progress. Readers should 
communicate comments on the manuscript directly to the author(s). 
 
The papers can be downloaded from the SFB 882 website http://www.sfb882.uni-bielefeld.de/  
 
 
 
 
SFB 882 “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” 
University of Bielefeld  
Faculty of Sociology 
PO Box 100131  
D-33501 Bielefeld  
Germany 
Phone: +49-(0)521-106-4942 or +49-(0)521-106-4613 
Email: office.sfb882@uni-bielefeld.de 
Web: http://www.sfb882.uni-bielefeld.de/ 
  
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
DFG Research Center (SFB) “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” 
 
Whether fat or thin, male or female, young or old – people are different. Alongside their physi-
cal features, they also differ in terms of nationality and ethnicity; in their cultural preferences, 
lifestyles, attitudes, orientations, and philosophies; in their competencies, qualifications, and 
traits; and in their professions. But how do such heterogeneities lead to social inequalities? 
What are the social mechanisms that underlie this process? These are the questions pursued 
by the DFG Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB)) “From Heterogeneities to 
Inequalities” at Bielefeld University, which was approved by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) as “SFB 882” on May 25, 2011. 
In the social sciences, research on inequality is dispersed across different research fields 
such as education, the labor market, equality, migration, health, or gender. One goal of the 
SFB is to integrate these fields, searching for common mechanisms in the emergence of 
inequality that can be compiled into a typology. More than fifty senior and junior researchers 
and the Bielefeld University Library are involved in the SFB. Along with sociologists, it brings 
together scholars from the Bielefeld University faculties of Business Administration and 
Economics, Educational Science, Health Science, and Law, as well as from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In 
addition to carrying out research, the SFB is concerned to nurture new academic talent, and 
therefore provides doctoral training in its own integrated Research Training Group. A data 
infrastructure project has also been launched to archive, prepare, and disseminate the data 
gathered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Research Project A1 “Social Closure and Hierarchization: Contextual Conditions of 
Unequal Developmental Opportunities in Early Phases of Life” 
This project extends research on the genesis and effects of individual heterogeneity to cover 
psychological characteristics and their interplay with socioeconomic characteristics. It looks at 
cognitive and non-cognitive competencies on the one hand, and various dimensions of 
cultural and social capital on the other, asking how far these overlap, how far each 
determines the genesis of the other, and how far each impacts upon academic success and a 
successful life. Do they contribute particularly strongly to the early and largely irreversible 
reduction of opportunities, to the accumulation of advantage and disadvantage? For the first 
time, two established but previously unconnected research traditions are being integrated into 
one research design. Although this means a certain degree of competition between them, it 
simultaneously creates the possibility of integrating the two bodies of existing knowledge. 
 
The studies are conducted not only on the level of the individual life course, but also taking 
into consideration the contextual conditions of different family constellations, social networks 
and neighborhoods, and educational organizations and institutions. All these contextual levels 
may harbor social exclusion mechanisms. The particular significance of the family of origin for 
the genesis of social inequalities is taken into account by considering both the stratification 
features of families of origin and the increasing diversity of family structures, with the resulting 
hierarchization of family positions and roles. In addition, the project goes beyond differences 
between families to study differences in the significance of one and the same family for its 
various members – particularly for siblings in terms of gender, age difference, and birth order. 
The project focuses on the early phases of life. Empirically, it will pay special attention to 
developing and implementing innovative operationalizations of life-course cohort analyses, 
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and comparable panel studies in 
other countries, primarily the Child Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). 
 
 
The Author 
Andrés Cardona is a member of the SFB 882 research project A1 “Social Closure and 
Hierarchization: Contextual Conditions of Unequal Developmental Opportunities in Early 
Phases of Life”, and PhD candidate at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology 
and at the Integrated Research Training Group of SFB 882. His research interests include 
agent-based modeling (ABM), social network analysis, and the intergenerational transmission 
of social inequality. 
Contact: andres.cardona@uni-bielefeld.de    
 
1 
 
The Programmatic Bias in the Discussion on Social 
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Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades, the concepts of ‘social mechanism’ and ‘mechanistic explanation’ 
have increasingly found their way into both theoretical and empirical work in sociology. This 
paper contributes to the already extensive literature on the subject by offering, from a 
sociologist’s perspective, a critical appraisal of the direction the debate has taken. It is argued 
that in developing a mechanistic agenda in sociology, the basic tenets of a mechanistic 
approach—generative causality and a commitment to causal explanation that effectively deepen 
our understanding of phenomena—have been displaced by individual programmatic priorities 
serving particular theoretical and methodological preferences. To raise awareness of this 
tendency and bring needed clarity to the debate on social mechanisms, a plea is made to 
distinguish programmatic conveniences from general claims on causation and causal 
explanation. Only then will a philosophically informed, broad-based, and inclusive dialog on the 
necessity and potential advantages of a mechanistic approach enriched by contributions from all 
corners of the discipline become possible.  
Keywords 
 
Social mechanisms, mechanistic explanations, causation, causal explanation, analytical 
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____________________________ 
† 
I would like to thank Martin Diewald, Florian Ferger, Andreas Haupt, and Andrea Hense for their insightful 
comments on previous versions of this paper.  
2 
 
Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed an almost explosive growth in scientific and 
philosophical publications on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations.1 Debates on how 
mechanisms should be defined, identified, modeled, and tested have become almost ubiquitous 
both in the life sciences (Bechtel, 2006; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; 
Machamer, 2004; Machamer et al., 2000; Schaffner, 1993; Thagard, 1999) and the social 
sciences (Collier and Mazzuca, 2008; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998a; Johnson, 2006; Lawson, 
1997, 2003).   
In a nutshell, statements about mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in science can be 
said to address two main issues that are related to causation and causal explanation, 
respectively. First, the emphasis placed by advocates of a mechanistic perspective on exploring 
the connection between cause and effect, the ‘mechanism’, suggests a particular notion of 
causation that goes beyond Hume in regarding causes as generative processes that actively 
produce effects (Harré, 1972: 115–118; Machamer, 2004: 34; Machamer et al., 2000: 21–22; in 
sociology, see Goldthorpe, 2001).2 Second, and as a critical reflection on the covering-law 
model of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), ‘mechanistic’ explanations are nothing more than a 
plea to enlarge the focus of causal explanation beyond the logical formalities of a deductive-
nomological framework through an explicit commitment to effectively furthering our 
understanding of phenomena. To do so, causal explanation should not be limited to the mere 
subsumption of phenomena under law-like generalizations, but should also strive to reconstruct 
how causes bring about effects (Bunge, 1997, 2004).  
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The goal of the following discussion is not to defend the need or potential benefits of a 
mechanistic perspective in sociology, nor is it to judge the pertinence of these admittedly 
philosophical issues to the theory of causation and causal explanation. Rather, the main purpose 
of this paper is to raise awareness among sociologists of how the concept of mechanisms in the 
sociological discussion has silently drifted towards particular programmatic preferences in both 
theory and method. By drawing attention to this programmatic displacement of the mechanistic 
agenda in sociology, this paper seeks to minimize two threats to which sociologists who have 
followed the recent literature on the subject are exposed. These bear a close resemblance to the 
ones faced by statisticians struggling to judge the truth of a hypothesis: extreme gullibility and 
extreme skepticism. 
The first of these, extreme gullibility, can also be described as the uncritical acceptance of 
claims that are not necessarily true. Without an awareness of the very particular focus chosen by 
champions of social mechanisms, blind followers of their promises might find themselves 
defending questionable assertions about the nature of social phenomena and the way we make 
sense of them. Similarly, recognizing the programmatic character of the debate can temper 
extreme skepticism or the rejection of claims that might ultimately prove to be true. Confusing 
particular uses of the mechanism concept in sociology with the tenets of a mechanistic approach 
to science has led some to ignore the potentially enriching debate on causation and 
understanding through causal explanation that the idea of mechanism pretends to stimulate.   
Just as there are many unsuspecting followers of the debate on mechanisms in sociology 
who have been too quick in adopting a mechanistic language without a healthy dose of distance 
and skepticism, there are those who have been equally quick in giving up on understanding the 
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substance of the discussion. For both the gullible and the skeptical, this article is an invitation to 
reconsider the idea of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology by filtering out 
programmatic biases and focusing on its core message about causation and understanding 
through causal explanation. Only then will it be possible to conduct a fair discussion on whether 
a mechanistic agenda in sociology is desirable and viable. 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section briefly presents the case for social 
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology as argued by John Elster and Peter 
Hedström, two of its main proponents. The second and third sections illustrate how 
programmatic biases have exerted a decisive influence in framing the debate on social 
mechanisms, diverting attention from the core issues of causality and causal explanation to 
focus instead on well-known intradisciplinary disputes on theory and method. While section two 
concentrates on matters surrounding the definition of social mechanisms, section three turns to 
claims about the generality of mechanistic explanations and the relationship of mechanisms to 
laws. Taking a step back from the critical view of programmatic biases presented in sections 
two and three, the fourth section offers a short reflection on the inevitability of differences in 
theory and method when pursuing a mechanistic agenda in sociology. The last section 
concludes, making a plea for understanding the mechanistic perspective in sociology beyond 
particular methodological or theoretical preferences.  
Setting the Stage: A Brief Reconstruction of the Mechanistic Agenda in Sociology  
Although the word ‘mechanism’ has been a part of the discipline of sociology for years 
(Karlsson, 1958; Merton, (1949)1967), the concept has experienced a remarkable revival since 
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the publication of Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg’s collection of essays on analytical 
sociology in 1998.3 As a result of this increasing attention on the concept of mechanisms in 
sociology, a growing body of literature has emerged addressing the necessity, utility, and 
viability of social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in the discipline (for review 
articles, see Cherkaoui, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Gross, 2009; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 
Mahoney, 2001; Mayntz, 2004). 
Even if opinions on a mechanistic agenda in sociology have been heard from all corners of 
the discipline (Brante, 2008), the concept has been actively championed by just a handful of 
scholars.4 In particular, the works of Jon Elster and Peter Hedström are widely regarded as the 
most central and influential (Abbott, 2007; Bunge, 2004; Mahoney, 2001; Norkus, 2005). 
Despite the many small modifications to their ideas in recent years, their core argument for the 
idea of social mechanisms has remained relatively stable.5 The mechanism agenda in sociology, 
as understood by Elster and Hedström, has been offered as a solution to three sets of problems: 
(i) the limited understanding provided by a strict adherence to explanations that follow the D-N 
or covering-law model; (ii) the risks of using correlational analysis as the preferred tool for 
causal inference, in particular the dangers of spurious correlations and endogeneity; (iii) 
sociological theorizing based on statistical analysis or variable-based sociology on the one hand, 
as well as the search for grand theories or closed theoretical systems on the other. As a solution 
to each of these challenges, social mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations should (i) 
provide ‘deeper’ causal explanations that further our understanding of social phenomena by 
reconstructing how causes bring about effects (Elster, 1990: 6, 1999: 10; Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1996: 287); (ii) guide and strengthen causal inference by reducing the problems of 
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spurious correlation and endogeneity (Elster, 2007: Ch. 1, 2; Hedström, 1998b: 15-17; 
Hedström, 2008); 6 (iii) produce theories of middle scope of generality that favor 
multidisciplinarity and mitigate theoretical fragmentation within sociology (Hedström, 2005: 1, 
28; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998b: 1, 6; Hedström and Udehn, 2009). 7  
Efforts to deepen our understanding of social phenomena and improve causal inference and 
theory in sociology are certainly welcome. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the improvements in 
social science promised by champions of social mechanisms have found fertile ground in the 
minds of many sociologists. To mention only a few selected examples, fields as disparate as the 
study of political processes (Tilly, 2000, 2001), crime (Wikström and Sampson 2003), and 
globalization (Pickel 2006) have already adopted a mechanistic language. Yet, despite this 
positive resonance in many corners of the discipline, most of the discussion on the subject has 
gravitated towards narrow programmatic issues not related to the broader scope of the 
mechanistic argument. Thus, instead of deliberating on the pertinence or potential benefits of a 
deeper view on causation and causal explanation to guide sociological inquiry, the discussion 
has been pushed, perhaps inadvertently, into the intradisciplinary arena of programmatic 
struggles where particular methodological and theoretical issues have displaced more general 
discussion on mechanisms. This programmatic bias will be illustrated in the next two sections 
by taking a closer look at the definition of social mechanisms and the relationship between 
mechanistic explanations and laws. 
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Individual Agendas and the Definition of Social Mechanisms  
Anyone familiar with the discussion on social mechanisms would readily agree that two of 
its most salient features are the widespread confusion in defining the concept and the lack of 
rigor in employing it. Paradoxically, much of the debate on the potential advantages of a 
mechanistic approach in sociology has been conducted without having arrived at some minimal 
consensus as to what a social mechanism is. In the following, not only the extent of this 
conceptual confusion will be illustrated, but most importantly, it will be argued that the 
definitional chaos can be largely explained by calling attention to the individual preferences in 
theory and method of some of its more vocal advocates.  
The Magnitude of the Confusion 
In philosophy, perhaps the simplest formulation of what constitutes a mechanism was 
provided by Harré. For him, a ‘mechanism’ is ‘…any kind of connection through which causes 
are effective’ (Harré, 1972: 118). Yet, despite the apparent simplicity of this definition, the 
efforts collectively invested so far in giving the general intuition about the nature of 
mechanisms sociological substance have been rather modest if not outright confusing.  
To grasp the magnitude of the confusion, one has only to read Tilly’s attempted definition of 
social mechanisms, which includes among other elements the ‘transfer of energy among 
stipulated social entities’ (Tilly, 2004: 217); an obscure allusion to physical rather than social 
forces. As Mayntz (2004) remarks, ‘...a survey of the relevant empirical and methodological 
literature soon bogs down in a mire of loose talk and semantic confusion about what 
“mechanisms” are’ (p. 239). To which, some years later, Brante (2008) adds, ‘There are already 
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embarrassingly large amounts of definitions, some of which even contradict one another’ 
(p. 276). A year before, and after reviewing the literature on social mechanisms, Gerring (2007) 
had already suggested the possibility that ‘...since “mechanism” means so many different things 
– often quite contradictory to one another – it means nothing at all’ (p. 178).  
By the same token, and consonant with the diversity of definitions, there is already a 
remarkably long list of additional characteristics associated with social mechanisms. As 
reviewed by Gerring (2007), Gross (2009), and Mahoney (2001), mechanisms have been 
ascribed the most disparate attributes: they have been depicted, among other things, as both 
observable and unobservable, deterministic and probabilistic, macro and micro, hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical, reducible and non-reducible to lower levels of abstraction, action-based and 
non-action-based, and as referring to concrete phenomena in bounded contexts and representing 
universal phenomena cutting across contexts.  
This precarious situation in defining social mechanisms is hardly improved by the fact that 
central advocates of the mechanistic approach have changed their definitions of mechanisms 
more than once (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Elster’s and Hedström’s Definitions of Social Mechanisms. 
 
Jon Elster  Peter Hedström 
‘...intentional chains from a goal to an action as 
well as causal chains from an event to its effect’ 
(Elster, 1983: 24). 
 ‘...an integral part of an explanation which (1) adheres 
to the three core principles stated above [direct 
causality, limited scope and methodological 
individualism], and (2) is such that on the occurrence of 
the cause or input, I, it generates the effect or outcome, 
O’ (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996: 299). 
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Jon Elster  Peter Hedström 
‘...nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels – that can be 
used to explain quite complex phenomena’ 
(Elster, 1990: 3). 
 ‘...an integral part of an explanation which (1) adheres 
to the four core principles stated previously [action, 
precision, abstraction and reduction], and (2) is such 
that on the occurrence of the cause or input, I, it 
generates the effect or outcome, O’ (Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1998b: 25). 
 
‘...frequently occurring and easily recognizable 
causal patterns that are triggered under generally 
unknown conditions or with indeterminate 
consequences’ (Elster, 1998: 45); Also Elster 
(1999: 1); Elster (2007: 36). 
 ‘a constellation of entities and activities that are linked 
to one another in such a way that they regularly bring 
about a particular type of outcome’ (Hedström, 2005: 
11; Hedström and Bearman, 2009b: 4-8 ; Hedström and 
Ylikoski, 2010: 51). 
 
 
Aggravating this conceptual inflation, the diversity of views on social mechanisms and their 
properties have been accompanied by an unfortunate lack of care in the use of the concept. To 
mention just one example, in his categorization of the social mechanisms underlying inequality, 
Therborn (2006) defines mechanisms as ‘a kind of social interaction that yields a certain 
distributive outcome’ (p. 11; italics added). In the immediately following lines he describes the 
first of these mechanisms, ‘distantiation’, as a process that operates independent of interaction 
(pp. 11–12). The idea that interaction was the constitutive feature of social mechanisms seems to 
have faded away from one page to the next.  
A second, more subtle lack of rigor in employing the concept of social mechanism can be 
observed in other publications that try to identify or formulate concrete instances of 
mechanisms. As an example, when Tilly (2004) presented his bundle of nine mechanisms 
‘causing boundary change’ and ‘constituting boundary change’, and although he openly 
recognized their preliminary character (p. 216), the terminology was readily adopted and 
expanded in Pickel (2006). There the author used it to define a new set of mechanisms ‘causing 
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property transformation’ and ‘constituting property transformation’ (p. 37), which he then 
applied to explain post-communist transformation and globalization.   
In fact, and contrary to the impression given by the many authors trying to give the concept a 
stable definition, divested of any additional assumptions, the idea of ‘social mechanism’ is 
rather uncontroversial. Abstracting from the myriad of definitions of social mechanisms found 
in the literature and the numerous survey articles summarizing those definitions, it is possible to 
arrive at a simple formulation that includes only those elements that seem to be widely accepted 
as capturing the essence of the concept. Accordingly, social mechanisms can be described as 
regularly occurring phenomena that, given a set of initial conditions, display some robustness in 
producing certain outcomes (for a similar formulation, see Mayntz, 2004: 241–245). Aside from 
the notion of generative causality implied by this formulation, agreeing upon the existence of 
robust and regularly occurring phenomena connected to certain initial conditions should not 
pose any real difficulty or be a serious point of contention in the discipline.  
How Programmatic Considerations Influence the Definition of Mechanisms: An 
Example 
While conceptual diversity in itself is not necessarily undesirable or inevitably noxious, the 
semantic confusion permeating the debate on social mechanisms is symptomatic of a deeper 
anomaly: the programmatic bias. Anyone examining recently published work on the subject in 
sociology will gain the impression that much of what has been written on social mechanisms 
has been moved by two different forces: one that promotes the introduction of the concept and a 
second that pursues a particular theoretical or methodological agenda. Confusion arises 
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especially at the interception of the two forces, that is, when efforts at defining mechanisms are 
conflated with other personal methodological and theoretical affinities. This is especially 
confusing when those personal preferences are interpreted as the ‘true’ mechanistic agenda. 
This programmatic character of contemporary views on social mechanisms, I argue, is largely 
responsible for the diversity of definitions and has created difficulties in disentangling the core 
intuition underlying a mechanistic approach from other related assumptions regarding well-
known issues such as theories of action (rational choice vs. other alternatives) or social 
ontologies and methodologies (individualism vs. holism; quantitative vs. qualitative).  
To illustrate further the programmatic displacement of the discussion on social mechanisms 
and the confusion it engenders, a cursory look at the works of Hedström and his collaborators is 
instructive. Looking back at Table 1, a peculiar twist in Hedström’s definition of social 
mechanism catches the eye. While in his first two publications on the subject (Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1996, 1998b), social mechanisms are described as a mediator between cause and 
effect, in later publications he defines social mechanisms as constellations of ‘entities’ and 
‘activities’ producing a certain outcome on a regular basis (Hedström, 2005: Ch. 1; Hedström 
and Bearman, 2009b; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). Confronted with this changing definition, 
two questions naturally arise. First, why did the definition change? And second, what are these 
new categories, ‘entities’ and ‘activities’, supposed to mean? Answering these two questions 
reveals how individual decisions about particular social ontologies end up defining which 
direction the discussion on social mechanisms takes.  
To answer the first question, attention should be drawn to a particularity of the definition of 
social mechanisms found in Hedström’s first two publications on mechanisms (Hedström and 
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Swedberg, 1996, 1998b). There, he includes in the definition the conditions that any explanation 
should meet to be called mechanistic. These conditions are methodological individualism, 
middle-range theorizing, and direct causality (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996: 298–299) or 
action, precision, abstraction, and reduction (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998b: 24–25). While it 
is widely recognized that the notion of mechanism implies some sort of generative or direct 
causality (Harré, 1972: 115–118; Machamer, 2004: 34; Machamer et al., 2000: 21–22), the other 
elements of the definition are Hedström’s own choices regarding theory. When Hedström 
openly introduced his agenda for analytical sociology in 2005 it became clear that his initial 
definition of mechanisms was nothing different than his core tenets of analytical sociology 
(Hedström, 2005: Ch. 1; Hedström and Bearman, 2009b; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010), which 
faced him with the challenge of providing a separate, revamped formulation of his concept of 
social mechanisms independently of his new research agenda.  
To cope with this conceptual loss, he turned to the life sciences, and in particular to the work 
of Machamer et al. (2000). According to their work, which explicitly addresses the fields of 
neurobiology and molecular biology, mechanisms are to be understood as ‘…entities and 
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to 
finish or termination conditions’ (Machamer et al., 2000: 3). From this definition and following 
his predilection for methodological individualism, which is, to be sure, perfectly legitimate, 
Hedström transformed ‘entity’ and ‘activity’ into individuals and actions.8 Accordingly, social 
mechanisms are nothing more than the constellation of individuals and actions regularly 
producing an outcome (Hedström, 2005: 25–26).  
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It is certainly no heresy to change the definition of a concept. Nor is it a weakness to invest 
time and energy in developing a new agenda of analytical sociology, an effort that should 
indeed be applauded. The goal here is not to blame Hedström for having a particular view on 
sociology or to disregard his efforts to make his view on sociology compatible with a 
mechanistic agenda. Rather, the point to be highlighted is how the definition of mechanisms 
drifted away from a general discussion on causality and causal explanations and was driven 
instead by the exigencies of a new research agenda. In short, what started as an intuitive 
definition of mechanisms as the connection between cause and effect ended up, due to the 
necessities of the enterprise of analytical sociology, becoming a familiar formula for 
methodological individualism. 
Certainly, Hedström is not the first to raise such claims about mechanisms or methodological 
individualism, nor is he the only scholar to have tailored the concept to a specific 
methodological position. As an example, Elster similarly equates mechanisms in sociology with 
methodological individualism (Elster, 2007: 13), while Mayntz (2004: 246ff.) makes a plea for 
macro-level mechanisms (for a similar argument, see Ylikoski, 2011: 167–168). Still others 
argue for something in the middle: ‘nonreductive individualism’ (Sawyer, 2004: 266–267). 
Similarly, among those making a case for individual action as the core of a mechanistic 
approach, there are clear lines of disagreement about the appropriate theory of action. Many of 
the authors contributing to the collection of essays edited by Hedström and Swedberg (1998) 
condition the viability of the mechanism approach in sociology on rational choice theory (e.g. 
Boudon, 1998: 172–173). Not surprisingly, others have made similarly strong cases, in 
combination with social mechanisms, for alternative theories of action. For instance, while 
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Hedström (2005: Ch. 3) favors the Desire-Belief-Opportunity (DBO) theory, Gross (2009: 366–
369) has made a plea for a pragmatist theory. Still others, like Abbott (2007), have argued in 
favor of going beyond agents and motives, focusing instead on relations and processes.9 
The Confusing Opposition of Mechanisms and Mechanistic Explanations to Laws 
Parallel to the efforts to define social mechanisms, attempts at spelling out their additional 
properties and characterizing mechanistic explanations have been equally permeated by 
programmatically biased assertions.10 As has been reiterated by advocates of mechanisms in 
science, the basic claim about mechanistic explanations is their ‘transparency’ or commitment 
to reconstruct causal relationships in a way that effectively improves our understanding of 
phenomena (Bunge, 1997: 427–428, 455; Bunge, 2004: 207). Some sociologists have gone 
further than this, arguing that not only the commitment to understanding but also the level of 
generality distinguishes mechanistic explanations from other types of explanations. This is 
particularly true for the agenda of analytical sociology and its urgency to oppose mechanistic 
explanations to grand theories. Although this insistence on the difficulty to generalize 
mechanism-based explanations is a valid rhetoric weapon to argue in favor of middle-range 
theories (see for example Hedström and Udehn, 2009), it has led, as a byproduct, to the 
widespread belief that statements about mechanisms are fundamentally incompatible with law-
like generalizations as those found in the D-N model of explanation or even with lawfulness.11 
In the following, it will be briefly argued that none of these claims are necessarily true. They 
are merely particular positions taken by scholars defending their own theoretical positions and 
should therefore not be confused with general claims about mechanisms or mechanistic 
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explanations. In fact, not only are mechanistic explanations generalizable and akin to deductive 
arguments; the phenomena they describe, the ‘mechanisms’, necessarily assume the existence of 
general principles that explain their regular functioning.  
Mechanistic Explanations and Generalizations  
As already mentioned, the formulation of explanations by subsuming phenomena under laws 
has been criticized by advocates of a mechanistic perspective for a lack of commitment to 
furthering our understanding. The opposition of mechanistic explanations to the covering-law 
model is, then, first and foremost a question of understanding through causal explanation and 
not a claim about the generality of the premises in an explanation or the formal structure of the 
argument. Despite the clear emphasis on the quality, not the form, of explanations when arguing 
in favor of a mechanistic approach, some prominent scholars favoring mechanisms in sociology 
have suggested that the opposite of mechanistic explanations are laws (Elster, 1999: 5).12  Such 
assertions not only indicate an unjustified conflation of the covering-law model as a formal 
logical framework with one of its elements, law-like generalizations, but also, it fails to 
recognize that mechanistic explanations are compatible both with general prepositions and 
deductive-nomological arguments.  
To oppose mechanistic explanations to generalizations of wide scope is not an 
epistemological necessity. There is no reason to think that the level of generality of the premises 
invoked in any scientific explanatory argument should be fixed a priori at a given level simply 
because the explanation, as a whole, explicitly attempts to reconstruct the causal relationships 
underlying an outcome. The question about the generality of explanations, ‘mechanistic’ or 
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otherwise, should always be a matter of empirical and theoretical adequacy to be decided 
according to best practices of scientific research in a given discipline and not by the 
arbitrariness of a definition of what ‘mechanistic’ is supposed to mean.   
It is in this context of the generality of mechanistic explanations that Bunge (1997: 442) 
emphatically stresses that the search for laws should not be replaced by a search for 
mechanisms, but instead, that law statements incorporating mechanisms should be given 
preference. He insists that the opposite of a mechanistic explanation is an explanation with 
limited value to improve our understanding, not lawfulness (Bunge 2004: 198–202). This in turn 
implies that mechanism-based explanations might in fact be formulated to resemble the D-N 
model, subsuming a particular event under a general law-like generalization, in this case under 
law-like statements constitutive of a mechanism (Demeulenaere, 2011: 189-193; Glennan, 2002, 
348–349; Opp, 2007: 117–118). 
Mechanisms and Lawfulness  
Aside from the compatibility of mechanistic explanations with law-like propositions and the 
D-N model of explanation, the idea of mechanisms as regularly recurring phenomena 
necessarily implies the existence of certain deeper principles that underpin their recurrent and 
robust occurrence. In the natural and life sciences, philosophers have appealed to different 
ontological categories to explain the regularities displayed by mechanisms.13 To mention a few, 
Machamer et al. (2000) call them ‘entities’ and ‘activities’, Glennan (1996, 2002) ‘fundamental 
laws of physics’, and Woodward (2002) regularities invariant under interventions.14 In any case, 
and despite differences in the characterization of the internal workings of mechanisms, there 
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appears to be consensus among the many philosophers writing on the subject about the intuition 
that, in order to function, mechanisms depend on some deeper regularity that cannot be 
recursively reduced to ever deeper mechanisms (Glennan, 2010: 367–368). In Bunge’s words, 
‘mechanisms without conceivable laws are called miracles’ (Bunge, 2004: 196–197). 
Those who, despite the insistence of philosophers to the contrary, still see in social 
mechanisms a type of social phenomenon sui generis that can only be described in connection 
to more or less restrictive ceteris paribus clauses fail to recognize a fundamental distinction. As 
Gorski (2009: 182) reminds them, mechanisms differ from law-like phenomena not in their 
lawfulness, but rather in the variability of outcomes they produce as a result of changing 
conditions (Mayntz, 2004: 240). Accordingly, he explains, in very simple or closed systems, 
where conditions are stable and interaction with other factors is limited or otherwise predictable, 
mechanisms should always produce the same outcomes. Even Elster, who is otherwise 
pessimistic about the possibility of finding laws in social sciences, suggests that if the 
conditions triggering a mechanism are identified, their functioning may be transformed into a 
law of some generality (Elster, 1999: 36–44; Elster, 2007: 44).  
Are Programmatic Claims Necessary? 
Having argued in the past two sections that programmatic issues have deeply influenced the 
scope and focus of claims about mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology, a valid 
objection might be raised. How can a mechanistic agenda in sociology be put into practice if not 
by making use of particular theories or methods? Put differently, why should sociologist be 
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wary about programmatic preferences and not see them instead as valid and constructive 
attempts to give form to a mechanistic agenda in the discipline?  
It is certainly true that the notion of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in sociology 
cannot do without further substantive assumptions about the nature of the social world, nor can 
it be possible to articulate this in a coherent and productive manner without making decisions on 
theory and method. If generative causality is to be taken seriously, then, at a minimum, a social 
ontology that spells out which elements of the social world are regarded as causally effective is 
needed. On top of that, providing causal explanations that further our understanding and 
reconstruct how causes produce effects inevitably requires choosing adequate theoretical and 
methodological tools.   
Having said that, and even if ontological assumptions as well as theoretical and 
methodological choices are admittedly essential prerequisites to give the metaphor of 
mechanisms substance, this does not justify reducing the discussion on social mechanisms to  
unique ontologies, theories, and methods. This tension between the need for positive statements 
about the social world and about methodology on the one hand, and the impetus to further 
individual agendas on the other is captured by the following statement by Peter Hedström: 
‘Although the idea of mechanism-based explanation helps social scientists to 
avoid some philosophical pitfalls, the mere adoption of mechanism talk will not 
suffice. Much depends on how mechanism ideas are put to use; otherwise we end up 
with mere mechanism-based storytelling that lacks both theoretical rigor and 
empirical relevance. A broader vision of sociology is needed, which the so-called 
analytical sociology movement has attempted to articulate’ (Hedström and 
Ylikoski, 2010: 58). 
19 
 
So even if some programmatic bias in the discussion on mechanisms toward particular views 
on sociology is necessary, sociologists should be careful not to confuse general claims about 
mechanisms with particular ontological, theoretical, and methodological agendas put forward by 
individual scholars.  
Concluding Remarks 
This paper offered a critical reflection on the way the debate on mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations in sociology has unfolded over the last two decades. It was argued that 
the tendency of some scholars to emphasize their own individual theoretical and methodological 
preferences when using the concept has introduced more noise than clarity into the debate. It 
seems as if the discussion on social mechanisms has turned into an arena to fight multiple 
theoretical and methodological battles that evidently go beyond the initial intuitions implied by 
the mechanistic approach regarding causation and understanding through causal explanation.  
In view of this state of affairs, it is difficult to disagree with Norkus (2005: 351) when he 
argues that the discussion on social mechanisms merely reproduces old debates in the social 
sciences through a mere restatement of known theoretical and methodological oppositions in the 
form of a new ‘mechanistic talk’. Accordingly, the task of defining social mechanisms has been 
reduced to familiar antagonisms and perennial controversies regarding individualism and 
holism, reductionism and emerging phenomena, rational choice and non-rational choice theories 
of actions, quantitative and qualitative methods. All of these are major topics that have been 
present in one way or another since the beginnings of the discipline and have now been 
reformulated under a new mechanistic language.  
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The emphasis on individual predilections in theory and method when making use of the 
concept of social mechanisms explain why the discussion seems to have been more effective, at 
least up to now, in bringing forth particular agendas in the discipline (e.g., analytical sociology) 
than in fostering a more broadly based debate on causation and causal explanation in sociology. 
This programmatic bias of the discussion has a clear downside. It raises skepticism among 
sociologists about the pertinence of a mechanistic approach and its alleged novelty. Thus, while 
some appear to be more concerned with particular agendas, the skeptical are growing wary 
about the very notion of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations.  
Where to go from here? In the light of the foregoing remarks, two positions can be defended. 
First, an ‘opportunistic’ or ‘cynical’ position can be taken that reduces the concept of 
mechanism to a transient metaphor to be used instrumentally for higher programmatic goals. 
This, of course, would disappoint the gullible sociologist who had taken the social mechanism 
discussion at face value without being fully aware of its programmatic aspects. The skeptical, 
however, will be satisfied, for an opportunistic or cynical position justifies their skepticism. 
Second, and in contrast to this instrumental, programmatic view, a ‘purist’ position might be 
taken that judges the mechanistic perspective in its own right, not as an accessory metaphor to 
any particular program in sociology but as an ongoing debate on causation and causal 
explanation despite methodological and theoretical differences. Only if attention is directed 
away from programmatic struggles and focused on the core principles of generative causality 
and a commitment to understanding through causal explanation can a broad-based discussion on 
social mechanisms and mechanistic explanations be fruitfully pursued. This, again, would 
disappoint the gullible who think they can do without the philosophy. It might, in fact, also 
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disappoint the skeptical who had already given up the efforts to understand a mechanistic 
approach to sociology, rejecting it as vacuous ‘mechanistic talk’.  
Admittedly, the first alternative is the less costly. It protects the status quo for both the 
advocates and the skeptics of social mechanisms. By contrast, the second alternative might force 
sociologists at both ends of the spectrum to reconsider their positions. It implies diving squarely 
into philosophical questions and hence requires sociologists to invest time and effort in 
developing informed opinions on the philosophy of causation and explanation. If they fail to do 
so, they will very likely end up divesting the concept of its substance and the discussion on 
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations of its entire purpose. Among those ‘purists’ who 
decide to look into the philosophy of causation and causal explanation, some might decide not 
to support a mechanistic agenda while others who do support it will eventually have to choose a 
particular social ontology, theory, and method to put it into practice. However, and irrespective 
of these choices, probably only a purist position will allow for understanding and debate of the 
essence of a mechanistic approach, free from individual theoretical and methodological biases. 
And only then will gullibility or skepticism be warranted. 
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Notes 
1. The distinction between ‘mechanism’ and ‘mechanistic explanation’ can best be understood as a 
division between metaphysical and epistemological issues. The word ‘mechanism’ is usually reserved 
for ontological statements: mechanisms are; they exist and are constitutive of real phenomena. On the 
other hand, ‘mechanistic explanation’ refers to representations and abstractions of reality in the form 
of models or propositions that can be described as mechanistic either because they are in fact models 
of ontologically existing mechanisms, or simply because they rely on a form of mechanism-based 
thinking that is used to abstractly represent phenomena. Attempting to distinguish ontological from 
epistemological claims might prove helpful in avoiding misunderstandings, even if these two types of 
claims are ultimately very difficult to separate entirely. 
2. A comprehensive collection of articles surveying the most relevant conceptions of causation in 
philosophy, including Hume’s regularity theory, can be found in Beebee et al. (2009). 
3. For a review of the agenda of analytical sociology, see Manzo (2010). 
4. For critical responses to the advocates of social mechanisms, see Abbott (2007), Norkus (2005), Opp 
(2007), Reiss (2007), and Steel (2004, 2007). 
5. Both Elster and Hedström have been very active in publishing their views on mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanations. In the case of Elster, five books contain most of his thoughts on the subject 
(Elster, 1983, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2007). His early notions on mechanisms, found in Elster (1983), were 
modified in Elster (1990) and worked out in more detail in Elster (1998), Elster (1999), and Elster 
(2007). As to Hedström, his early views on social mechanisms can be found in Hedström and 
Swedberg (1996) and in his perhaps most quoted article of 1998, included as an introduction to the 
collection of essays on social mechanisms published in conjunction with other advocates of the 
mechanistic approach, including Raymond Boudon, Arthur Stichcombe, and Jon Elster (Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1998a). Besides these two early articles, Hedström’s ideas on mechanisms are most 
comprehensively developed in his book on analytical sociology (Hedström, 2005). Similar arguments 
are also found in the Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Hedström, 2008) and in more depth 
in two articles in The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, coedited with Peter Bearman 
(Hedström and Bearman, 2009a; Hedström and Udehn, 2009). His latest publication on the subject is a 
coauthored review article that summarizes both the philosophical and sociological debates on 
mechanisms and mechanistic explanations (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). 
6. For a glimpse into the philosophical discussion on mechanisms and causal inference, see Steel (2004, 
2007) and Weber (2007). 
23 
 
7. Of these three goals, the first two echo ideas extensively debated in the philosophy of science, and are, 
therefore, not confined to the social sciences. The third, by contrast, is mostly an intradisciplinary 
enterprise of analytical sociology (Manzo 2010). 
8. Whether this reconceptualization of Machamer’s definition is adequate should be left open for 
discussion. Although Machamer et al. do not preclude the possibility of extending their definition of 
mechanisms to the social sciences (Machamer et al., 2000: 2),  ‘entity’ and ‘activity’ need not 
necessarily be translated into actors and actions. It is also not clear in Hedström’s writings why other 
competing definitions of mechanisms found in the natural sciences and philosophy were ignored in 
choosing Machamer’s formulation. For example, why not define mechanisms using alternative 
categories like ‘parts’, ‘operations’, and ‘organization’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005: 423), 
‘complex system’ (Glennan, 1996: 53; 2002: 344) or ‘process in a system’ (Bunge, 2004: 186)? 
9. Still other theoretical and methodological oppositions in the mechanism debate in the social sciences 
are discussed in Gerring (2007). 
10. A mechanistic or mechanism-based explanation is nothing more than an explanation with the 
description of the functioning of a mechanism as explanans and the outcome of a mechanism as 
explanandum. 
11. In fact, Merton’s idea of middle-range theories is not a criticism of grand theories per se, but rather of 
premature attempts at producing them without having established the required empirical and 
theoretical foundations (Merton, [1949] 1965). It is for the purpose of this preparatory work that he 
envisions middle-range theories, arguing for ‘a developmental orientation’ to theorizing (p. 50) and 
making a plea to ‘look [...] toward progressively comprehensive sociological theory which [...] 
gradually consolidates theories of the middle range, so that these become special cases of more 
general formulations’ (p. 51). To fulfill this task, middle-range theories must ultimately be 
compatible with different general theories (p. 43). Hence Merton is not simply advocating a search 
for special theories of middle range as a way to avoid the formulation of more comprehensive, 
general theories; rather, he is making a case for the articulation of grand theories based on middle-
range theories, a bottom-up strategy to arrive at general theories. 
12. Laws are here loosely defined as ‘generalizations of wide scope that apply to many different kinds of 
systems and [...] have few or no (or at least a very limited set of) exceptions’  (Woodward, 2002: 368). 
13. It is true that, in principle, a mechanism can be decomposed into ever deeper mechanisms in such a 
way that its regular functioning is due to the regular functioning of some other, lower-level 
mechanism. This, however, leads ultimately to an infinite regress. In sociology, Hedström has 
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advocated ‘stopping rules’ of disciplinary relevance to overcome this difficulty and to avoid an 
infinite regress. Not surprisingly, given his methodological individualism, individuals and their 
actions are the bottom line of decomposition (Hedström, 2005: 19, 25–26). 
14. In later publications, Glennan abandoned the concept of law to describe the internal functioning of 
mechanisms and replaced it with Woodward’s idea of ‘direct, invariant, change relating 
generalizations’ (Glennan, 2002: 344). 
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